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Abstract 
 
This paper studies the normative problem of redistribution between agents who can influence 
their survival probability through private health spending, but who differ in their attitude 
towards the risks involved in the lotteries of life to be chosen. For that purpose, we develop a 
two-period model where agents's preferences on lotteries of life can be represented by a mean 
and variance utility function allowing, unlike the expected utility form, some – agent-specific 
– sensitivity to what Allais (1953) calls the 'dispersion of psychological values'. It is shown 
that if agents ignore the impact of their health expenditures on the return of their savings, the 
decentralization of the first-best optimum requires not only intergroup lump-sum transfers, but, 
also, group-specific taxes on health spending. Under asymmetric information, we find that a 
subsidy on savings is optimal, whereas group-specific taxes on health spending are of 
ambiguous signs. 
 
Keywords: longevity, risk, lotteries of life, expected utility theory, health spending. 
JEL Classification: D81, H21, I12, I18, J18 
                                                           
1 CORE, Université catholique de Louvain, Belgium. E-mail: marie-louise.leroux@uclouvain.be 
2 CREPP, FRS-FNRS, University of Liège, Belgium. E-mail: g.ponthiere@ulg.ac.be 
 
This paper presents research results of the Belgian Program on Interuniversity Poles of Attraction initiated 
by the Belgian State, Prime Minister's Office, Science Policy Programming. The scientific responsibility is 
assumed by the authors. 
 
1 Introduction
Whereas human longevity depends on factors of various natures - genetic,
environmental or sociocultural -, a large demographic literature also empha-
sizes the crucial influence of the individuals’ lifestyles on their longevity.1
Clearly, how long one lives is not independent from how one lives. Individual
longevity depends on the extent to which one is willing to ‘make an effort’
to improve or preserve his health, and differences in the amount of efforts
carried out by individuals tend to be reflected by longevity differentials.2
What should a utilitarian government do in front of such a heterogene-
ity of lifestyles and longevities? The answer clearly depends on the source
of the heterogeneity and on whether longevity is exogenous or not. How-
ever, it also depends crucially on the form of the individual’s preferences.
For instance, Bommier et al. (2007 a,b) show that if longevity depends
on exogenous health endowments, it is optimal to redistribute from short-
lived toward long-lived individuals only when individuals have additively
separable preferences, while relaxing this latter assumption, agents should
be compensated for their poor longevity. As they explain in their work,
assuming additively separable preferences leads to an implicit assumption
of net risk neutrality toward the length of life which leads to strong (and
disputable) conclusions in terms of redistribution.3
Starting from the works of Bommier et al. (2007 a,b), we might, on
the opposite, examine the redistributive consequences of another potential
source of heterogeneity in preferences: the attitude of agents towards risk
and, more precisely, towards risk on longevity. This source of heterogene-
ity is generally ignored since most economic models assume both expected
1See Vallin et al (2002).
2Health-improving efforts can take various forms: the effort can be either temporal (e.g.
physical activity, see Surault 1996 and Kaplan et al. 1987), physical (e.g. abstinence of
food, see Solomon and Manson, 1997), or monetary (e.g. health services, see Poikolainen
and Eskola, 1986).
3See Bommier (2005) on the notion of risk neutrality toward the length of life.
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utility and additive lifetime welfare which, as we already mentionned, pre-
supposes that all agents exhibit risk-neutrality with respect to the length
of life.4 But it is not difficult to see that the attitude towards risk plays
a crucial role here, so that assuming a generalized net risk-neutrality with
respect to longevity is a quite strong postulate.
Clearly, when an individual chooses how much to invest in his health, he
does not choose a certain length of life, but, rather, expresses a preference for
a particular lottery of life, whose different scenarii involve different lengths
of life.5 The chosen level of health-improving effort will not be a guarantee
of a longer life, but only of a longer expected length of life with also some
possible consequences on the variance of the length of life.6 Thus, in the
context of risk about the length of life, individual choices of health-improving
efforts may reflect their attitudes towards risk about the length of life, so
that the making of a uniform assumption on the attitude towards risk may
oversimplify the problem of the optimal public intervention.
Let us illustrate this with the following example (see Figure 1). A person
of age 50, who has a disease, can choose between two possible lotteries of life:
either lottery A, ‘no medical treatment’, or lottery B, ‘medical treatment’
(assumed to be costless).7 Under no medical treatment, the patient is certain
to live the next 10 years for sure, but not longer. On the contrary, under
the medical treatment, the patient can die during the intervention with a
probability 1/2, but can, if the intervention is a success, live until the age
of 70 years with a probability 1/2. What will the patient choose?
It is not straightforward to see what the patient will decide. Actually,
each lottery exhibits the same expected length of life, equal to 60 years,
but different degrees of risk about the length of life: whereas lottery A is
4One of such models is Leroux (2007).
5Strictly speaking, we should talk of a lottery on the length of life rather than of a
lottery of life.
6To be precise, the chosen level of health-improving effort is likely to influence the
dispersion of the ages at death.
7Consumptions per life-period are assumed to be the same under the two lotteries.
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risk-free, lottery B is risky regarding the length of life.8
 
                                    A dilemma faced by a patient of age 50. 
       
  Lottery A: no health treatment                              Lottery B: health treatment 
 
 
 
                       Probability = 1                   Probability = 1/2                     Probability = 1/2        
 
 
         Death at age 60                                        Death at age 50            Death at age 70 
                                                                      (= immediate death) 
 
 
 
 
Choice between two lotteries of life
Under net risk-neutrality with respect to the length of life, a patient
would be totally indifferent between lotteries A and B, and would toss a
coin to decide whether he will undergo the medical treatment or not. How-
ever, such an indifference is highly unlikely, because the degree of risk about
the length of life is a non-neutral information for decision-makers. Thus, it
is likely that individuals differ largely regarding their attitude towards risk,
and do not all exhibit risk-neutrality with respect to the length of life. Ob-
viously, some patients, who are risk-averse with respect to the length of life,
will choose no medical treatment (lottery A), while some others, who are
risk-lover, will choose the medical treatment (lottery B).9 As this example
illustrates, the observed inequality in health-influencing efforts is likely to
reflect the heterogeneity of preferences, and, in particular, the heterogeneity
of individual attitudes towards risk. But this raises the difficult question of
the optimal public policy in that context: what should a utilitarian govern-
ment do in front of such a heterogeneity in the attitude towards risk?
8Note that, in general, the choice of an effort level influences not only the expected
length of life and the variance of the age at death but also per period utility.
9Alternatively, if the treatment had the virtue not to raise, but to reduce the variance
of the age at death, risk-averse agents would ceteris paribus opt for the treatment.
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The goal of this paper is to examine the optimal public policy in an econ-
omy where agents can influence their survival by exerting some monetary
effort, but differ regarding their attitude towards risk with respect to the
length of life. For simplicity, we assume that individuals live for a maximum
of two periods, the first one being certain while the second one is conditional
on survival. Naturally, by choosing their health expenditures, agents choose
a specific lottery of life, which reflects their attitude toward risk.
So as to account for individuals’ attitude toward risk on longevity, we
model individual preferences using a ‘mean and variance’ utility function,
and we assume that individuals have different sensitivities to the variance
of lifetime welfare.10 As this is well-known since Bommier’s (2005) work,
there exist two broad ways to depart from net risk-neutrality with respect
to the length of life. One way is to relax additive lifetime welfare, as in
Bommier’s (2005) works; the alternative solution is to relax the expected
utility hypothesis. The former approach has the advantage to keep on relying
on the - convenient - expected utility theory, but suffers from a lack of
intuition behind non-additive lifetime welfare. This is why, in this paper,
we prefer to keep additive lifetime welfare but to relax the expected utility
hypothesis. Thus, lifetime welfare is still assumed to be additive in temporal
welfare (without pure time preferences), but the expected utility hypothesis
is here replaced by a less restrictive postulate.
More precisely, it is assumed that agents’s preferences on lotteries of life
can be represented by a ‘mean and variance’ utility function of the kind
defended by Allais (1953) in his seminal paper. Actually, Allais emphasized
that, given that the dispersion of psychological values is ‘the specific element
of the psychology of risk’ (Allais, 1953, p. 512), it follows that ‘[...] even in a
first approximation, one should take into account the second order moment
10Actually, the ‘mean and variance’ utility form is a special case of what Machina (2007)
calls the ‘Moments of Utility’ approach in non-EU theory, followed by Hagen (1979) and
Munera and de Neufville (1983).
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of the distribution of psychological values’ (1953, p. 513).11 Moreover, it
was also quite clear in Allais’s mind that ‘[...] one cannot regard as irra-
tional a psychological attitude in front of risk that takes the dispersion of
psychological values into account.’(see Allais, 1953, p. 520).12 We shall thus
postulate a mean and variance utility function, which is a simple generaliza-
tion of the EU form accounting for Allais’s intuition. Naturally, other forms
could be chosen instead (see Stigum and Wenstop, 1983; Schmidt, 2004), but
the mean and variance utility function has the advantage of simplicity.13
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents the
model and derives the laissez-faire equilibrium. Section 3 studies the first
best social optimum and its decentralisation. The second-best problem is
considered in Section 4. Conclusions are drawn in Section 5.
2 The model
2.1 Environment
Let us consider a population of individuals who live a first period of life
(whose length is normalized to one) with certainty, but survive to the second
period only with a probability π. This probability depends positively on
some monetary investment m:
π = π(m)
equivalently, m can be regarded as a private health expenditure made by the
agent in the first period of his life, so as to increase his survival probability.
We assume here that agents have the same survival function π(.) with π′(.) ≥
0 and π′′(.) ≤ 0.
11Original version: ‘[...] même dans une première approximation, on doit tenir compte
du moment d’ordre deux de la distribution des valeurs psychologiques’.
12Original version: ‘[...] on ne saurait considérer comme irrationnelle une attitude psy-
chologique devant le risque qui tient compte de la dispersion des valeurs psychologiques.’
13Moreover, that functional form shall, unlike the expected utility function, allow some
risk-aversion with respect to the length of life, even under additive lifetime welfare.
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However, agents are assumed to differ in their preferences. In order to
introduce these differences in preferences, we assume that individual pref-
erences can be represented by a function having the ‘mean and variance’
utility form (see Allais, 1953), and that agents exhibit different degrees of
sensitivity to the volatility of welfare:14
Uγ = u¯γ − γvar(uγ)
where u¯γ is the expected lifetime welfare of an agent with type γ, while
var(uγ) is the variance of his lifetime welfare.
15 The parameter γ reflects
the sensitivity to the variance of lifetime welfare exhibited by a lottery of
life. Under complete insensitivity, γ equals 0 and we are back to standard
expected utility theory. On the contrary, if γ is positive, the agent prefers,
ceteris paribus, lotteries with a lower variance of lifetime welfare across sce-
narios, while a negative γ reflects the tastes of ‘variance-lover’ agents.16
Under a zero utility from death and additive lifetime welfare (with no
pure time preferences), the expected lifetime welfare u¯γ is:
u¯γ = π(mγ) [u(cγ) + u(dγ)] + (1− π(mγ)) [u(cγ)]
= u(cγ) + π(mγ)u(dγ)
where cγ and dγ denote, respectively, first and second period consumptions of
an individual with type γ. The function u is increasing and strictly concave.
Moreover, we assume that for all consumption levels that are considered we
have:
cγu
′ (cγ)
u (cγ)
< 1
14Note that this function, although more general than the usual expected utility func-
tion, could still be generalized by taking into account higher moments of the distribution
of lifetime welfare across scenarios of lotteries of life. For more general functions, see
Hagen (1979) and Machina (1983).
15Note that preferences represented by a function of that form do not necessarily satisfy
the independence axiom, as the initial ordering between two lotteries may be inverted by
a convex combination of those lotteries.
16By abus de langage, it could also be said that agents with a higher γ are more ‘risk-
averse’ than agents with lower γ levels.
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which is standard in the litterature that studies the welfare benefits related
to longevity extension.17 In this two-scenarios world, the variance of lifetime
welfare takes a quite simple form:
var(uγ) = [(u(cγ) + u(dγ))− (u(cγ) + π(mγ)u(dγ))]
2
+[u(cγ)− (u(cγ) + π(mγ)u(dγ))]
2
= [u(dγ)]
2
[
(1− π(mγ))
2 + (π(mγ))
2
]
(1)
where, for ease of notation, we denote var(uγ) ≡ var (dγ ,mγ) in the follow-
ing. At this stage, let us note the ambiguous effect of the effort level on the
variance of lifetime welfare. Actually,
∂var (dγ,mγ)
∂mγ
= 2π
′
(mγ) [u(dγ)]
2 [2π(mγ)− 1]
>
=
<
0⇐⇒ π(mγ)
>
=
<
1
2
Hence, a higher effort level tends to raise the variance of lifetime welfare if
π(mγ) exceeds 1/2, whereas it tends to lower it if π(mγ) is lower than 1/2.
While the effect of health effort on the variance of lifetime welfare is
ambiguous, one expects, intuitively, that agents tend generally not to prefer
lotteries of life with a lower life expectancy to lotteries with a higher life
expectancy, so that ∂Uγ
∂π
is, in general, non-negative. Imposing the condition
∂Uγ
∂π ≥ 0 amounts to assume:
∂Uγ
∂π
= u(dγ)− 2γ [u(dγ)]
2 [2π(mγ)− 1] ≥ 0
which, under γ > 0, is true for all levels of dγ if and only if π(mγ)  1/2
for all levels of effort mγ. Thus, we shall, throughout this paper, assume
that π(mγ)  1/2 for all levels of mγ . A corollary of this postulate is that
var (dγ,mγ) is decreasing in mγ.
2.2 The laissez-faire
Agents of type γ choose first period and second period consumptions, as well
as health expenditure so as to maximize their objective function subject to
17See Murphy and Topel (2006) and Becker et al. (2005).
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their budget constraint:
max
cγ ,dγ ,mγ
Uγ(cγ, dγ,mγ)
s.to
{
cγ = w− sγ −mγ
dγ = Rsγ
where lifetime utility takes the following form
Uγ(cγ, dγ,mγ) = u(cγ) + π(mγ)u(dγ)− γvar (dγ,mγ) (2)
and var (dγ,mγ) is equal to (1). We assume that savings are entirely invested
in private annuities and that R is the return of an annuity. The wealth
endowment w is exogenous and identical for all agents. Note also that there
is no pure time preference, and that the interest rate is zero.
Assuming actuarially fair prices (i.e. R = 1/π(mγ)), the laissez-faire
allocation for an agent of type γ satisfies the following conditions:
u′( cγ) = u
′(dγ)− γvard (dγ,mγ) /π(mγ (3)
u′( cγ) = π
′(mγ)u(dγ)− γvarm (dγ,mγ) (4)
where varx (x, y) and vary (x, y) are partial derivatives of the variance of life-
time welfare with respect to x and y. Condition (3) characterizes the optimal
saving decision. In the absence of any sensitivity to the variance of lifetime
welfare (γ = 0), each agent would choose to smooth consumption over time
(i.e. cγ = dγ ∀γ), because of the conjunction of no pure time preference,
an actuarially fair annuity price and a zero interest rate. However, under
a positive γ, cγ > dγ ∀γ since vard (dγ ,mγ) is always positive ; thus the
sensitivity of agents to the variance of lifetime welfare makes them consume
more in the first period. Actually, consuming more during the first period is
a simple way to insure oneself against undergoing a big loss of welfare if one
dies at the end of the first period. Thus, concentrating consumption in the
first period is a straightforward way to protect oneself against a too large
variation of lifetime welfare across scenarios of the lottery of life. Note also
9
that the higher γ is, the steeper the intertemporal consumption profile will
be ceteris paribus, because the more variance-sensitive the agent is, the more
he will use that trick to avoid big welfare losses. This result is presented in
the proposition below:
Proposition 1 If the market of annuities is actuarially fair, cγ > dγ for
any individual with type γ > 0.
Condition (4) characterizes the level of health expenditure chosen by
the individual in the equilibrium. Under traditional expected utility theory,
this condition would collapse to u′( cγ) = π
′(mγ)u(dγ), stating that the
optimal health expenditure is such that the marginal welfare gain due to
health expenditure (in terms of the second period of life) should equalize
the marginal welfare cost of such an effort. However, under a positive γ,
the marginal lifetime utility from health expenditure depends also on its
impact on the variance of lifetime welfare (second term in brackets), which is
always positive since we assume that π(mγ) is lower than 1/2. Thus, under
positive sensitivity to the variance in welfare, the level of health investment
is always greater than under expected utility theory. Note also that in
the Laissez-Faire, the individual does not take into account the impact of
health expenditures on the return of his savings, R = 1/π(mγ) so that the
individual chooses a level of health expenditures which is too high compared
to its optimal level.18
We can now study the equilibrium levels of consumptions and of health
expenditure between individuals with different sensitivities to the variance
in welfare. To simplify, let assume two individuals, 1 and 2, with sensitivity
to the lifetime variance such that γ1 > γ2. Our results are summarized in
the following proposition:
18This result is highlighted in Becker and Philipson (1998). Actually, each agent tends
to consider that his own health effort will not affect the return of the annuity whereas at
the aggregate level it does. This is also emphasized in Sheshinski (2007, chapter 7).
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Proposition 2 Provided the market for annuities is actuarially fair, the
Laissez-Faire allocation is such that, for any two individuals with sensitivity
to the variance in welfare such that γ1 > γ2,
(i) if c1 = c2, then d1 < d2 and m1 ≥m2 or d1 ≤ d2 and m1 > m2,
(ii) if d1 = d2, then c1 > c2 and m1 ≤ m2 or c1 ≥ c2 and m1 < m2.
Note first that, given the postulated general functional forms for u(c)
and π(m), it is not possible, in the present model, to fully describe the
optimal levels of consumptions and health expenditures for the two types of
agents. Depending on the particular functional forms chosen for u(c) and
π(m), agents’s consumptions and efforts (cγ, dγ,mγ) may a priori vary in
different ways. This is why we equalize first or second period consumptions
between individuals so as to determine how the chosen variables (cγ , dγ ,mγ)
differ across agents.
If first-period consumption is equal for the two types of agents, then
it is necessarily the case that an agent who has a larger sensitivity to the
dispersion of psychological values chooses a lower second-period consump-
tion and more health spending than an agent with a lower γ. The intuition
behind that result is the following. For a more sensitive agent, having a
lower second-period consumption and spending more on health is a rational
way to reduce the variance of lifetime welfare since the potential loss (i.e.
second-period utility) would be smaller and this would happen with a lower
probability. Agents with a lower γ do not have the same concerns, and
thus choose, for an equal first period consumption, a higher second-period
consumption and a lower health effort.
If, alternatively, it is second-period consumption that is equal for both
types of agents, then, without surprise, agents who are more sensitive to
the variance will consume more in the first period in comparison to less
variance-sensitive agents, so that, given the budget constraint faced, they
will also invest less in health in comparison with agents with a lower γ. That
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result is not surprising, as consuming more in the first period is a standard
way to insure oneself against a too large volatility of lifetime welfare.
Thus, one cannot say, under general functional forms, whether agents
with a higher γ will spend more or fewer ressources in health. A higher
sensitivity to the dispersion of psychological value may imply that an agent
spends more on health (at the cost of second-period consumption) or on
the contrary, spends less on health (to favour first-period consumption).
That indeterminacy can be explained as follows. The two ways to protect
oneself against a high volatility of lifetime welfare are either to spend a lot
on health or to spend a lot in first-period consumption. Which solution
dominates depends on the curvatures of u(cγ) and π(mγ). If π
′(mγ) is large
and u′(cγ) is low, then agents with a higher γ will opt for the first way to
avoid lifetime welfare variance; on the contrary, if π′(mγ) is low and u
′(cγ)
is large, agents with a higher γ will opt for the second as a more efficient
way to avoid lifetime welfare volatility.
3 The first best problem
3.1 The social optimum
In this section, we assume that the social planner is utilitarian and that
he perfectly observes individuals’ types.19 The social planner can lend or
borrow at a zero interest rate in order to balance the budget at any given
period. The resource constraint of the economy is thus:∫ γmax
γmin
(cγ + π (mγ)dγ +mγ) f (γ)dγ ≤ w (5)
where f (γ) is the distribution function of the γs in the population. Thus,
the social planner chooses consumption paths as well as health investments
19Note that the standard Benthamite utilitarian criterion exhibits various limitations in
general, and in the particular context of endogenous longevity (see Broome, 2004). Thus,
it is used here on the mere grounds of analytical conveniency.
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levels for each type of individuals in order to maximize∫ γmax
γmin
(u(cγ) + π(mγ)u(dγ)− γvar (dγ,mγ)) f (γ) dγ
subject to (5).
The first order conditions yield:
u′(cγ) = λ (6)
u′(dγ)− γ
vard (dγ,mγ)
π(mγ)
= λ (7)
π′(mγ)u(dγ)− γvarm (dγ,mγ) = λ
[
1 + π′ (mγ)dγ
]
(8)
Combining (6) and (7), we obtain the optimal trade-off between present and
future consumptions; this is identical to our Laissez-Faire condition (3) when
the price of the annuity is actuarially fair. Thus, first-period consumption is
still preferred to future consumption in the first best. On the contrary, (8)
together with (6) differs from (4) by a term −λπ′ (mγ) dγ. In the first best,
the social planner realizes that the level of health expenditure also modifies
the budget set. Indeed, a higher level of effort mγ not only increases direct
utility through higher survival but also decreases consumption possibilities
as π (mγ) increases in (5). Thus, in the first best optimum, the social planner
induces the individual to exert lower effort so as to limit the negative impact
of mγ over the individual’s budget set; this was not the case in the Laissez-
Faire as the individual was taking the annuity return, R as given. These
first results are summarized in the following proposition:
Proposition 3 The first best allocation is such that, for any individual with
sensitivity γ > 0
(i) mFBγ < m
LF
γ ,
(ii) cγ > dγ.
where mFBγ andm
LF
γ are the level of health expenditures in the first best
and Laissez-Faire respectively. We now turn to the allocation of consump-
tions and of health expenditure according to individuals types. Obviously,
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first-period consumption is equalized across individuals. However, consider-
ing (7) and (8), there is no reason for second period consumptions and health
expenditure to be identical across individuals. A priori, it is impossible to
rank health expenditures and consumptions depending on individuals’ types,
unless some additional assumptions are made. Therefore, we assume two in-
dividuals with types γ1 and γ2 such that one is sensitive to the variance in
lifetime welfare and the other is not and obtain the following results:20
Proposition 4 Consider two types of individuals with sensitivity to the
variance in welfare such that γ1 > 0 and γ2 = 0. The first best yields:
(i) c1 = c2 = c¯,
(ii) d1 < d2,
(iii) m1 ≷ m2.
In the first best, first period consumption is equalized across individuals
while second period consumption and health expenditures are differentiated
between individuals.
The individual with a zero sensitivity to the variance obtains a higher
level of second-period consumption than a variance-sensitive agent. This
result is not surprising, as second-period consumption tends necessarily to
raise lifetime welfare variance.21 Given that lifetime welfare variance enters
type 1’s utility negatively, it does not come as a surprise that the social
optimum implies d1 < d2.
However, it is not clear whether health expenditures should be higher
or lower for the individual with higher sensitivity to the variance. This
indeterminacy can be explained as follows. On the one hand, higher health
investment reduces the lifetime welfare variance of variance-sensitive agents,
which matters for those agents (unlike for agents of type 2), and, as such,
20This proposition is proven in Appendix B.
21Clearly, in the extreme case where second-period consumption equals 0, and u(0) = 0,
there is a zero lifetime welfare variance despite the risk about the length of life.
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is justified on the grounds of social welfare maximization. On the other
hand, dedicating more resources to the health of variance-sensitive agents
has, given d1 < d2, a smaller impact on the expected lifetime welfare of
agents of type 1 than on the expected lifetime welfare of agents of type 2.
Hence, whether m1 exceeds m2 or not depends on which effect dominates.
As shown in the Appendix, if γ1 is extremely large, one necessarily has
m1 > m2, because the social welfare gain from dedicating more resources to
the health of agents of type 1 is here large (given the extreme sensitivity of
those agents to the variance of lifetime welfare) and thus largely compensates
the social welfare loss due to the lower second-period utility exhibited by
the life of agents of type 1.
3.2 Decentralisation
We now study how to decentralise the above optimum through a tax-and-
transfer scheme. In the following, we assume that instruments available for
the social planner are a tax on savings, a tax on health expenditures and
lump sum transfers. We still assume that the annuity market is actuarially
fair so that R = 1/π (mγ) at equilibrium. The individual’s problem is then
to maximize:
u (w − sγ (1 + tγ)−mγ (1 + θγ) + Tγ) + π (mγ)u (Rsγ)− γvar (Rsγ ,mγ)
where tγ is the tax on savings, θγ the tax on health expenditures and Tγ is a
monetary transfer for any individual with sensitivity γ. Deriving first order
conditions with respect to sγ and mγ and rearranging them, we obtain
|MRSc,d (cγ, dγ,mγ)| ≡
π (mγ)u′ (dγ)− γvard (dγ ,mγ)
u′ (cγ)
= π (mγ) (1 + tγ) (9)
|MRSc,m (cγ, dγ,mγ)| ≡
π′(mγ)u(dγ)− γvarm (dγ,mγ)
u′ (cγ)
= (1 + θγ)(10)
where |MRSc,d (cγ , dγ,mγ)| and |MRSc,m (cγ , dγ,mγ)| account for the mar-
ginal rates of substitution between c and d and between c and m expressed
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in absolute value. Thus comparing these conditions with both (6), (7) and
(8), we find that the optimal tax on savings is always zero for any type of in-
dividual, e.g. tγ = 0 but the optimal level of the tax on health expenditures
θγ should be equal to π
′ (mγ) dγ > 0. This can be related to Becker and
Philipson (1998); by implementing a positive tax on health expenditures,
one limits health expenditures and make it tend toward its first best level.
Back to the results of Proposition 4, in the specific case where γ1 > 0
and γ2 = 0, one should have that θ1 = π
′ (m1)d1 < θ2 = π
′ (m2) d2 so
that m1 > m2. This is the case whenever γ1 is high. Otherwise, θ1 ≶ θ2 if
m1 < m2. We also find that if m1 < m2, the level of expected consumption,
defined by
c¯+ π(mγ)dγ +mγ
is always greater for individual with type-2 than for the individual with
type-1. In this case, the first best optimum transfers resources from the
individual with higher sensitivity to the variance to the individual with the
lowest one and T1 < T2. On the opposite, if m1 ≷ m2, the direction of
transfers is ambiguous and T1 ≷ T2.
4 The second best problem
In this section, we now relax the assumption that the social planner observes
individuals’ sensitivity to the variance in lifetime welfare. Using results of
Proposition 4, if the social planner was offering first best bundles, individuals
might have interest in claiming to be of the other type so as to get higher
consumption and/or benefit from higher health expenditures (depending on
first best levels of cγ, dγ,mγ).
22 This is why, in the following, we write
a general second best problem in which we prevent any individual from
22For instance, if the first best allocation is such that d1 < d2 and m1 < m2, individual
1 may have interest in claiming to be of type-2 (only if increasing d2 does not increase
too much his variance and/or if γ
1
is sufficiently low) . On the contrary, if d1 < d2 and
m1 > m2 in the first best, one or the other (or both) type(s) might lie on his (their)
type(s) so as to get higher consumption or higher health expenditures.
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mimicking the other:
max
∫ γmax
γmin
Uγ (cγ,mγ , dγ) f (γ) dγ
s. to


∫ γmax
γmin
(w − cγ − π (mγ) dγ −mγ) f (γ) dγ ≥ 0
u(cγ) + π(mγ)u(dγ)− γvar (mγ, dγ) ≥
u(cγ′) + π(mγ′)u(dγ′)− γvar
(
mγ′ , dγ′
)
∀γ, γ′
where the last constraint is the incentive constraint and states that any indi-
vidual with type γ should always be better-off with his bundle (cγ , dγ ,mγ)
than with the allocation designed for any other type γ′. As we show in
Appendix, the continuum of above incentive constraints can be transformed
into a local incentive compatibility constraint which has the following ex-
pression
U˙ = −var (mγ, dγ) < 0
where a dot means that U is derived with respect to γ and the second order
local conditions are m˙γ ≤ 0 and d˙γ ≥ 0.23 In the Appendix, we show that
the second best optimum yields the following trade-offs between 2-period
consumptions and between health investment and first period consumption,
in absolute value:
|MRSc,d (cγ, dγ,mγ)| = π (mγ)
[
1−
µ (γ) var
d
(mγ, dγ)
π (mγ)λf (γ)
]
(11)
|MRSc,m (cγ, dγ,mγ)| = 1 + π
′ (mγ)dγ −
µ (γ) varm (mγ, dγ)
λf (γ)
(12)
with λ, the Lagrangian multiplier associated to the ressource constraint
and var
d
(mγ , dγ) > 0, varm (mγ, dγ) < 0. Comparing (11) and (12) with
(9) and (10) of the decentralized problem, , we find that the second best
optimum could be decentralized by implementing taxes on savings and on
23From now on, we assume that second order local conditions are satisfied (i.e. that
m˙γ ≤ 0 and d˙γ ≥ 0). If this was not the case on some interval, one would have bunching
over this interval.
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health expenditures equal to
tγ = −
µ (γ) var
d
(mγ , dγ)
π (mγ)λf (γ)
θγ = π
′ (mγ)dγ −
µ (γ) varm (mγ , dγ)
λf (γ)
where the co-state variable associated to the local incentive constraint, µ (γ)
has the following expression
µ (γ) = λ
∫ γ
max
γ
(
1
λ
−
1
u′ (cγ)
)
f (γ) dγ (13)
with µ (γmax) = µ (γmin) = 0 from the transversality conditions.
Let now study the level of these taxes. First, the usual result of no
distortion at the top and at the bottom holds; for the individuals with
the highest sensitivity and the ones with the lowest sensitivity, the trade-
offs between two-period consumption and between consumption and health
expenditures are equivalent to the first best ones. Thus, the tax on savings
is zero in this case (tγmin = tγmax = 0) and health expenditures are taxed in
the same way as in the first best, i.e. θγmin = π
′
(
mγmin
)
dγmin and θγmax =
π′
(
mγmax
)
dγmax .
On the contrary, for any other type γ ∈ ]γmin, γmax[, the signs of tγ and
θγ are not clear and depend on the sign of µ (γ). In our model, µ (γ) rep-
resents the social net marginal welfare gain of increasing the tax on savings
for individuals with types above γ. Indeed, increasing the tax on savings
first generates a gain in increased revenue, 1/u′ (cγ) per person but it also
generates a loss in welfare measured in units of revenue equal to 1/λ. Since
µ (γmax) = µ (γmin) = 0, it is straightforward to show that µ (γ) first de-
creases and then increases in γ so that µ (γ) has always a negative sign.24
Thus, in the second best, it is always optimal to subsidize savings, and the
level of this subsidy will be higher for individuals with types in the middle
ranges. Note also that the level of this tax depends on the mass of individ-
uals with types above γ, represented by π (mγ) f (γ). Imposing a subsidy
24Our analysis is similar to Atkinson and Stiglitz (1980).
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on savings is a way to relax the incentive constraint and avoid mimicking
behavior.
However, the sign of θγ is uncertain and might be positive or nega-
tive depending on the size of two countervailing effects. On the one hand,
π′ (mγ) dγ > 0 which corresponds to the Becker-Philipson effect; as we al-
ready mentionned in the first best, imposing a tax on health expenditures is
a way to limit individuals’ investment in health and thus its negative impact
on their budget set. On the other hand, −µ (γ) varm (mγ, dγ) /λf (γ) < 0
and is related to the incentive effect; in order to avoid mimicking behaviours,
the social planner would like to subsidize health expenditures. For instance,
if individuals could perfectly see the impact of their health investment on
their budget set, the Becker Philipson effect would be absent and in the sec-
ond best, subsidization of health expenditures would be optimal; the level
of this subsidy would be higher for individuals with middle range sensitivi-
ties. Thus, for any individual with types γ ∈ ]γmin, γmax[, the overall effect
on the sign of θγ is ambiguous and depends on the magnitude of both the
Becker-Philipson and the incentive effects.
Our findings are summarized in the proposition below:
Proposition 5 Assume a population of individuals with sensitivity to the
variance γ ∈ [γmin, γmax] and with density function f (γ). Under asymmetric
information,
• The “no distortion at the top and at the bottom” result holds.
• A subsidy on savings is optimal and is equal to tγ = −µ (γ)
var
d
(mγ ,dγ)
π(mγ)λf(γ)
for any γ ∈ ]γmin, γmax[.
• A tax on health expenditures is optimal and equal to θγ = π
′ (mγ) dγ−
µ (γ) varm (mγ, dγ) /λf (γ) for any γ ∈ ]γmin, γmax[; but whether it is
positive or negative is ambiguous.
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5 Conclusion
This paper aims at studying the optimal taxation policy in an economy
where agents can influence their longevity through health efforts but who
differ in their attitude towards lotteries of life. For that purpose, we set up
a two-period model in which the agents influence their survival probability
by means of first-period health spending. Moreover, the heterogeneity of
agents is captured by assuming that preferences on lotteries of life can be
represented by various sensitivities to the variance of lifetime utilities.
It is shown that, in the laissez-faire, a higher sensitivity to the dispersion
of psychological value implies that an agent spends more on health (at the
cost of second-period consumption), or, on the contrary, spend less on health
(to favour first-period consumption). The choice between those two ways to
protect oneself against a high volatility of lifetime welfare depends on the
specific functional forms for u(cγ) and π(mγ).
At the social optimum, first-period consumptions are equalized across
agents, whereas agents with a higher sensitivity to the variance should have
a lower second-period consumption. It is not obvious to see whether more
variance-sensitive agents should benefit from higher or lower health expen-
ditures, as, from a social point of view, the welfare gain from reducing the
variance of their lifetime welfare is to be compared with the lower expected
welfare associated with the survival of those agents (given their lower second-
period consumption). The social optimum can be decentralized by means of
group-specific taxes on health spending (to internalize the Becker-Philipson
effect) and by adequate lump-sum transfers, whose directions depend on
whether more sensitive agents should have higher health spending or not.
Under asymmetric information, it is shown that a subsidy on savings
constitutes a simple way to avoid mimicking across agents. However, the
sign of (group-specific) taxes on health spending remains ambiguous, and
depends on two effects: first, given the non-internalization by agents of
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the impact of their effort on the return of their savings, it is optimal to tax
health expenditures; second, subsidizing health expenditures is also a way to
guarantee incentive-compatibility. Hence, the resulting sign of the optimal
tax on health is unknown.
To conclude, it should be stressed that the present study, by focusing
exclusively on one source of heterogeneity across agents - their sensitivity
to variance of utilities - only covers one aspect of the design of the optimal
taxation policy under endogenous (differentiated) longevity. Undoubtedly,
other sources of heterogeneity exist, regarding, for instance, the genetic back-
ground, the degree of rationality/myopia, the impatience or the disutility of
efforts. Hence, one could hardly hope to provide a complete answer to that
problem without considering what the optimal policy becomes when those
various sources of heterogeneity coexist. To answer that question, a crucial
point will concern how those different characteristics are correlated across
individuals types. Thus, in the light of the difficulties faced in the present
study where agents differed in only one aspect, one could hardly overesti-
mate the problems raised by a more complete study of optimal taxation in an
economy where agents differ in several characteristics influencing longevity.
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Appendix
A Laissez Faire: proof of Proposition 2
The laissez-faire allocation for an individual of type γ satisfies the following
FOCs:
u′(cγ) = u
′(dγ)
[
1− 2γu(dγ)
(
2π(mγ)− 2 +
1
π(mγ)
)]
u′(cγ) = π
′(mγ)u(dγ) [1− 2γu(dγ) (2π(mγ)− 1)]
Suppose now that γ1 > γ2. If c1 = c2 = c¯, we have:
u′(c¯) = u′(di)
[
1− 2γiu(di)
(
2π(mi)− 2 +
1
π(mi)
)]
u′(c¯) = π′(mi)u(di) [1− 2γiu(di) (2π(mi)− 1)]
The second condition excludes the cases where (1) c1 = c2, m1 < m2
and d1 > d2, (2) c1 = c2, m1 ≤ m2 and d1 > d2, (3) c1 = c2, m1 < m2
and d1 ≥ d2. Moreover, the budget constraint excludes the cases where (1)
c1 = c2, m1 ≥ m2 and d1 > d2 and (2) c1 = c2, m1 > m2 and d1 ≥ d2.
Hence, it must be the case that m1 ≥ m2 and d1 < d2 or m1 > m2 and
d1 ≤ d2 .
The part (ii) can be proven by similar reasoning.
B First Best
We rewrite (7) and (7) for each type under the assumption that γ1 > 0 and
γ2 > 0:
u′(d1)
[
1− 2γ1u(d1)
(
2π(m1)− 2 +
1
π(m1)
)]
= λ
u′(d2) = λ
π′(m1)u(d1)
[
1− 2γ1u(d1) (2π(m1)− 1)− λ
d1
u (d1)
]
= λ
π′(m2)u(d2)
[
1− λ
d2
u (d2)
]
= λ
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Combining first two equations, one finds that d1 < d2. Using two last
equations we find that m1 ≶m2. In the specific case where γ
1 is very high,
such that
1− 2γ1u(d1) (2π(m1)− 1)− λ
d1
u (d1)
> 1− λ
d2
u (d2)
for any level of di, one has that m1 > m2.
C Second best problem
C.1 Local incentive constraint
The continuum of global incentive constraints can be transformed into a
local incentive constraint by applying the following method. First,
max
γ˜
u(cγ˜) + π(mγ˜)u(dγ˜)− γvar (mγ˜ , dγ˜)
yields
u′(cγ˜)c˙γ˜ + π
′(mγ˜)u(dγ˜)m˙γ˜ + π(mγ˜)u
′(dγ˜)d˙γ˜
− γ
[
vard (mγ˜ , dγ˜) d˙γ˜ + varm (mγ˜, dγ˜) m˙γ˜
]
= 0
whenever γ˜ = γ. And solving the following problem,
maxUγ =
γ
u(cγ) + π(mγ)u(dγ)− γvar (mγ, dγ)
where we replace for the above equality, one obtains
U˙γ = −var (mγ , dγ)
with m˙γ ≤ 0 and d˙γ ≥ 0. This yields the local incentive constraint.
25
25Similar approach can be found in Diamond (1998).
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C.2 Second best solution
Using the local incentive constraint, U˙ = −var (mγ , dγ), the problem can
be rewritten as
max
∫ γmax
γmin
[u(cγ) + π(m)u(dγ)− γvar (m,dγ)] f (γ)dγ
s.to


∫ γmax
γmin (w − cγ − π (mγ) dγ −mγ) f (γ) dγ ≥ 0
Uγ = u(c) + π(m)u(d)− γvar (m, d)
U˙γ = −var (mγ , dγ)
m˙γ ≤ 0 and d˙γ ≥ 0
We define three control variables cγ, mγ and dγ , and a state variable, Uγ.
The Hamiltonian is then
H = Uγf (γ) + λ (w− cγ − π (mγ)dγ −mγ) f (γ)
−α (γ) [Uγ − u(cγ)− π(mγ)u(dγ) + γvar (mγ, dγ)]
−µ (γ) [−var (mγ, dγ)]
where µ (γ) is the co-state variable associated with U˙γ = −var (mγ, dγ),
α (γ) is the shadow value of the constraint Uγ = u(c)+π(m)u(d)−γvar (m,d)
and λ is the lagrange multiplier associated to the resource constraint. From
the Pontryagin principle,
µ˙ (γ) = −
∂H
∂Uγ
= α (γ)− f (γ)
Optimizing with repect to cγ , mγ and dγ also yields:
∂H
∂cγ
= −λf (γ) + α (γ)u′(cγ) = 0
∂H
∂dγ
= −λπ (mγ) f (γ) + µ (γ) vard (mγ , dγ)
− α (γ)
[
−π(mγ)u
′(dγ) + γvard (mγ , dγ)
]
= 0
∂H
∂mγ
= −λ
(
π′ (mγ) dγ + 1
)
f (γ) + µ (γ) varm (mγ, dγ)
− α (γ)
[
−π′(mγ)u(dγ) + γvarm (mγ , dγ)
]
= 0
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The transversality condition are µ (γmax) = µ (γmin) = 0. Rearranging terms
yield
π(mγ)u
′(dγ)− γvard (mγ , dγ)
u′(cγ)
=
λπ (mγ) f (γ)− µ (γ) vard (mγ , dγ)
λf (γ)
π′(mγ)u(dγ)− γvarm (mγ , dγ)
u′(cγ)
=
λ (π′ (mγ) dγ + 1) f (γ)− µ (γ) varm (mγ, dγ)
λf (γ)
where the left hand sides are simply |MRSc,d (cγ, dγ,mγ)| and |MRSc,m (cγ, dγ,mγ)|.
Note that µ (γ) has the following expression
µ (γ) = −
∫ γmax
γ
µ˙ (γ)dγ
=
∫ γmax
γ
f (γ)− α (γ)dγ
= λ
∫ γmax
γ
(
1
λ
−
1
u′(cγ
)
f (γ)dγ
where we made use of ∂H/∂cγ = 0.
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